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ARRESTED BY THE IMAGE
I. INTRODUCTION
 Let us start with the shudder . . .
 I carry with me a horizon constituted by countless cinematic scenes: a woman 
walks alongside a stone wall, dragging her knuckles against it such that they bleed; 
an elevator door opens to reveal a shadowy figure holding a razor blade; rose petals 
fall from the skies, as do frogs; a spaceship hovers over Manhattan; cars explode on a 
busy city street; a child is pushed from a high window. I am not separate from these: 
my images.
 In Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque,1 Richard Sherwin argues, and 
I would agree, that such a self-constitution is not confined to the individual—that we 
live in a time in which contemporary visual culture mimics the achievements of the 
baroque in the domains of art and architecture through perspective, decoration, the 
positionality of the subject, and particularly through the fold, in which the subject can 
be said to enter the visual field and be enfolded by and within it. Rather than being 
regarded as separate from such image-making, law participates in, depends upon, and 
is constituted by it. Law is thus known through and in its images. And at a time 
when, as noted earlier, images constitute both the individual and the horizon against 
which the individual knows herself to exist, the proliferation of visual forms in 
contemporary society engenders a sense of surfeit, of the endless need for and excess 
of visual representation. Once again, law cannot be regarded as separate from this 
vertiginous dependence upon visuality, but plays a part in creating what can be called, 
in acknowledgement of the contemporary evocation and restaging of the baroque 
fascination for the potentials and possibilities of the image, the neo-baroque.
II. LAW AND THE NEO-BAROQUE
 The visual field of the neo-baroque is characterised by Sherwin as “awash in 
images,”2 like the endless scroll of green data that makes up reality in The Matrix.3 
But just as the presence of a cat indicated a “glitch” or perforation in the unrelieved 
uniformity of the matrix’s simulated reality, for Sherwin, every so often the vast sea 
of images in the neo-baroque, filled with “empty sensation,” is punctuated by an 
encounter with the sublime:
Something that was absent was suddenly given an uncanny visual and aural 
presence. The juxtaposition of words, voice, and image sublimely incarnated a 
terrible past that somehow, impossibly, haunted the present. We witness the 
event (on the screen), and we shudder.4
1. Richard K. Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques & 
Entanglements (2011).
2. Id. at 13.
3. The Matrix (Warner Bros. Pictures 1999).
4. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 4–5.
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 So let us begin with the shudder, which marks the occurrence of “a legal event” 
in the “temporally f lattened but emotionally amplified now time of viewing the 
screen.”5 What Sherwin is describing relates to a moment during a trial in which 
substantial use was made of visual material in order to present evidence and to 
construct argument. Indeed, uncertainty about the implications of the increasing 
reliance on visual material in legal processes animates much of Sherwin’s book, 
which argues that there is a crucial need to understand, and to critique, the images 
presented as part of legal argument and evidence.6 His book, however, is much more 
than a how-to guide for lawyers, since it argues that the ability to understand the 
visuality of the neo-baroque is a central ethical obligation: “awash in images”7 which 
are potentially only the arabesques of “aesthetic delight,”8 the subject requires a means 
by which to resist the f lood of imagery and to remember herself as an entangled 
being—one who exists in a network of obligation and ethics. And this returns us to 
the shudder, for it is the shudder in the presence of the visual sublime which, for 
Sherwin, both confirms the possibilities of the image as an ethical conduit and 
reminds the subject of her responsibilities and responsiveness.
III. THE IMAGE AND ITS ENTANGLEMENTS
 My paper takes up what might be an anxiety in Sherwin’s book about the “digital 
baroque”—an anxiety that manifests in descriptions of visual culture as a “digital 
simulacrum,” “mere sensation,” a “f light of fancy,”9 or “empty baroque form”10 in 
which “the real grows elusive”11 and is filled with “vexatious uncertainty.”12 The very 
digitality of the digital sometimes seems in the book to give rise to anxiety. “Digital” 
for decades has denoted the representation of data as a series of numerical values, 
with a more recent specific connotation involving the computerisation of information. 
It is this association that leads to the classic image of the scrolling numbers on the 
screens in The Matrix as constitutive of a world (our world) rather than simply 
representative of it: that a world could be reduced to symbols on a screen is presented 
as appalling. Sherwin shares in that distaste and is concerned to investigate why and 
how the digital, having colonised the social, has crept throughout the legal as well.
 I wish, however, to point us towards the fact that “digital” has another meaning, 
pertaining to the fingers, from the Latin digitus, which underlies its meaning in 
regard to numerical data—for, before machines and even before the abacus, 
individuals counted on their fingers, the primary means through which we touch 
5. Id. at 77.
6. Id. at 5 (“[T]his book argues for the cultivation of visual literacy . . . .”).
7. Id. at 13.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 9.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id.
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another person or thing. And what of “the real,” which for Sherwin “grows elusive” 
in this digital world?13 I would say that it is not hidden somewhere under the weight 
of neo-baroque visuality, but exists instead in and as a result of every image. And, 
unlike the abhorrent nature of the screens of data in The Matrix, this should not be 
something that is feared. As Patricia Pisters writes (following Gilles Deleuze): 
“Images are there; they do not represent some other-worldliness but constantly shape 
the world and its subjects.”14
 It is possible, then, to think of digital visuality not as a problem we have to get 
beyond, but rather as a condition of possibility which allows us to live in and through 
the image, with all the delights and dangers that that implies. Such an art of life 
requires that we attend to the image in all its engagements with us, not just as a 
conduit for visual information. Let us take the example of film. Although an image 
obviously exercises our ability to look and to interpret its visuality, the cinematic 
image has always been more than something to be looked at. If we take into account 
the cinematic nature of the medium of film, we are confronted by its eloquent 
harnessing of image, sound, affect, memory, plot, episode, character, story, and event. 
Such is the cinematographic dimension of film, since it is through this that cinema is 
able to elaborate the affective relation between spectator and image.15
 My aim in emphasising the cinematographic dimension of cinema is partly about 
reminding us of the difficulty of analysing a form which is in continual f light, each 
moment of meaning succeeded by another, twenty-four frames per second. And in its 
metaphorical sense, “cinematographic” describes the processes by which a moving 
image is created, and our task as scholars of film is to think through the ways in 
which an image is written in time, in the body, in memory. The result allows us to 
think of the cinematic image as something that is not only watched, but also heard, 
felt, lived, and remembered.
 If we approach the cinematic image as cinematographic, this allows us to engage 
with its actuality (while acknowledging, as Deleuze would point out, that each actual 
image exists contingently in a plane surrounded by immanent virtual images). It is not 
a window onto some other world or a transcendental mirror onto our own. Its actuality 
consists in its cinematic tactility and in its relation with the spectator, who is 
constituted both by its cinematographic detail and in the connection experienced at 
the level of sense with the event on the screen—the spectator makes sense of the image. 
A cinematic image is thus an “encountered sign”: a “sign that is felt, rather than 
recognized or perceived through cognition,”16 in which the body of the spectator 
13. Id.
14. Patricia Pisters, The Matrix of Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze in Film Theory 3 
(2003). 
15. Since “cinematography” is often understood as a purely technical term referring to aspects of a film’s 
visual appearance, I should say that I am not using this term in a way that is confined to visual devices 
such as lighting, filters, camera angles, and so on. Rather, I use the term “cinematographic” in both its 
literal and metaphorical senses: literally, “cinematography” means “the writing of movement” (from 
Greek, kinema, meaning movement; and graphein, meaning to write).
16. Jill Bennett, Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma and Contemporary Art 7 (2005). 
81
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
registers sensations relating to what she is seeing without undergoing or having 
undergone what is depicted, and sees sensation become sense (meaning). As Nathan 
Moore states in his article, this is an account of the sensed image, an intensive 
rendering rather than an extensive one.17 The affective relation of the spectator to the 
sensed image is a way in which our bodies connect with the world—as Brian Massumi 
writes, “[w]ith intensified affect comes a heightened sense of belonging,”18 while at the 
same time, as Pisters reminds us, “the subject feels itself ‘from the inside’.”19
IV. ARRESTED BY THE IMAGE
 In this semiotic encounter, how is the spectator addressed by the image? If we 
follow Deleuze’s argument, that the cinematic image is an encountered sign and the 
cinematic universe constitutes a “network of relations,”20 we are then able to attend to 
the fullness and complexity of the cinematic image—an image that exists not just on 
a visual plane, but also in sound, time, movement, memory, and affect. In 
encountering the cinematic image, seeing is only one dimension of the spectator’s 
relationship to it—just as important are hearing, feeling, remembering.
 However, the recitation of the other senses raises the danger that they will be 
relegated to the role of supplements to the visual experience, with vision still privileged 
above the others, or that other senses will be elevated to the privileged position 
currently occupied by vision. Instead, we need to think of encountering the image as a 
hugely complex moment which manages to incorporate the imagined physicality of the 
image, its sounds, smells, look, touch, our memories, our projections—a haptic 
encounter.21 Because we encounter it haptically, how does the image address us as 
spectators? To think of spectatorship haptically retains the importance of relationality 
between spectator and image, while also indicating that the cinematic scene is both 
momentary and ongoing, static and in motion, projecting a future at the same time as 
it shows a continuous present laminated over a perpetually receding past. To return to 
Sherwin’s book, while much of the visual field is characterised in it as mere aesthetic 
delight, some images are said to have the capacity to do more than offer visual pleasure:
17. Nathan Moore, Image and Affect: Between Neo-Baroque Sadism and Masochism, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 
97, 105 (2012–2013) (“This means that images are not limited to the visual—or rather, that the visual is 
one modality of the image, vision being itself an image. To understand this more clearly, it is necessary 
to insist on the relationship between images and exhaustion. Encounter, sensation, perception, and so 
on, are all processes of exhaustion, whereby what is perceived, sensed, or encountered occurs not in 
between two entities, but rather as a vector or transition.”).
18. Mary Zournazi, Navigating Movements: A Conversation with Brian Massumi, in Hope: New 
Philosophies for Change 214 (2002).
19. Pisters, supra note 14, at 70.
20. Id. at 21.
21. In using the term “haptic,” I do not mean to insinuate any privileging of the tactile over the visual; 
rather, as Deleuze and Félix Guattari write: ‘“Haptic” is a better word than “tactile” since it does not 
establish an opposition between two sense organs but rather invites the assumption that the eye itself 
may fulfill this non-optical function.’” Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia 492 (1987). 
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At some point something must occur to arrest the unending profusion of 
empty baroque form. . . . I call that event the sublime. The sublime arrests 
the recession of the real and the ethical. It helps us to reassert our fealty to 
reality, which is to say, our capacity to respond to what others and the concrete 
situation that we face demands of us.22
 For Sherwin, then, some images arrest the emptiness, the f low of 
meaninglessness—but only some. For my purposes, I am also interested in arrest as 
an interruption, but I would suggest that every cinematic image is always already 
able to “arrest” us. The visual field is constituted by potentiality: at any moment we 
may be arrested by an image. Consider Louis Althusser’s famous account of the 
police officer who calls out, “Hey, you there!” resulting in an individual turning 
around, and in that 180-degree movement, being “interpellated” as a subject.23 Just 
as we hear the police officer’s voice and turn, so the cinematic image hails us, and we 
are interpellated in a scene, a narrative, a moment, a figure, a gesture.
 A colloquialism in English, deriving from the slang of the 1930s, suggests that 
when a police officer thus hails us, we have been “fingered,” made, identified by 
authority, implicated. The moment of interpellation in film identifies us as spectators, 
confirming the address of the image to us, reaching us haptically, in an encounter that 
touches the spectator visually, audibly, in memory, and on the body. Such a fingering, 
when the digital image reaches the body, insinuates the image under the skin.
 What then, can be said of law when we are fingered by film, when the image gets 
under our skin? If images are approached for their content, then law, crime, and justice 
are thematics dominating digital visual culture. As I have argued elsewhere, “The 
crime drama, with law enforcement as its central trope, provides the spectator with 
the pleasure of punishment, a pleasure [Richard] Sparks calls a ‘consoling’ one in the 
face of the pains of a violent world.”24 The courtroom drama, which makes suspense 
out of legal discourse and process, offers spectators the vicarious pleasure of prosecution 
and of defence, and it constructs the jury’s verdict or the judge’s ruling as the sense of 
an ending towards which all narrative moves. “In this approach, the scene of judgment 
acts as a kind of screen . . . : the spectator is [projected] as abhorring violence and 
gratified when a violent criminal receives their just punishment,” or as desiring 
resolution and seeking judgment—just as a reader seeks the last page of a book.25
 But such a construction cannot encompass the vicissitudes and complexities of 
spectatorship. To approach the cinematic image as a window onto a world, or as a 
cultural seam whose stories can be mined for an understanding of how the law is 
understood, fails to grasp the co-implication of law, image, and spectatorship. To 
22. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 9.
23. Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other 
Essays 174–76 (1971).
24. Alison Young, The Scene of Violence: Cinema, Crime, Affect 41 (2010) (discussing the 
argument made by Richard Sparks in Dramatic Power: Television, Images of Crime and Law Enforcement, 
in Censure, Politics and Criminal Justice (Colin Sumner ed., 1990)).
25. Id. 
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return to the moment of fingering, when the image gets under the spectator’s skin, to 
be fingered by the police denoted becoming suspect; to be fingered by an image 
denotes becoming both judge and judge-able. Thus, spectatorial investment in the 
image involves less a straightforward desire for the consolations of law and more a 
paradoxical oscillation between pleasure in judging and pleasure in being judged—and 
found wanting. The relation, then, is one of co-implication, in which the spectator 
and law, and the spectator and the image, are enfolded within each other, their 
contours and substances passing through and around each other.
V. CONCLUSION
 Two decades ago Frances Barker wrote of the “tremulous private body”—a body 
that around the time of the Restoration in late seventeenth-century Britain became 
conceptualised in ways that attributed sensation, emotion, and interiority to the 
individual, a body thus instantiated as a subject.26 The digital image continues and 
depends upon that process of subjection—as we are fingered by the image; its touch 
confirms our subject position as judge-able and able to judge, as guilty and as 
exonerable. It is the haptic encounter that makes such a relation possible, and it is the 
haptic encounter that allows an image to crawl under our skins, gripping us as 
subjects. Sherwin presents this grip as an instance of the “visual sublime.”27 I would 
suggest that this grip, this fingering, is even more significant than he allows, since it 
structures our relation with the image and its address to us. The rolling screens of 
green data are not necessarily vacant or meaningless or fearful, and it is not only the 
occasional image that arrests us with its shudder. Arrest is the necessary possibility 
for all images; sublimity is the necessary possibility for all images, and our 
co-implication—our being fingered—is the inevitable condition of our subjection.
26. See Frances Barker, The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection (1995). I mention the 
Restoration to indicate a particular period in time, and a particular place (late seventeenth century 
Britain), both of which are key to Barker’s argument. It is similar to the sense of period and place evoked 
in a term such as “the baroque.”
27. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 73.
